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Bolton Corp. v. EA. Loving Co.: The Reservation of Rights
Clause in Settlement Agreements
Because court dockets have become increasingly more congested1 and liti-
gation costs have risen,2 potential litigants and their attorneys have turned to
private settlement of disputes as an alternative to litigation. Although the vast
majority of private settlements accomplish just what they are intended to
achieve-the "[buying of] peace respecting any liability" between the parties 3 -
courts still address disputes regarding the validity, interpretation, and effect of
settlement agreements. In Bolton Corp. v. TA. Loving Co.4 the North Carolina
Supreme Court faced such a dispute. The issue in Bolton was whether a con-
struction contractor, whose insurer settled the claim of another contractor in-
volved in the same project against the insured, and who thereafter ratified the
settlement, should have been barred from maintaining an action against the re-
leasor arising out of the same construction project.5 In a decision that focused
realistically on the nature of the relationship between the parties, the Bolton
court held that plaintiff contractor's claim against the releasor was not barred by
plaintiff's ratification of such a settlement, when the release contained a clause
purporting to reserve plaintiff's rights against the releasor. 6 This Note traces
the development of the doctrines of settlement and release, and accord and satis-
faction in North Carolina and analyzes the Bolton decision in light of these doc-
trines. The Note concludes that in Bolton the supreme court consistently
applied North Carolina law regarding settlements, and in the process preserved
the ability of contracting parties to make their own bargains, free from unwar-
ranted judicial interference.
Both plaintiff Bolton Corporation (Bolton) and defendant T.A. Loving
Company (Loving) were prime contractors for the construction of the Walter R.
Davis Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 7 Bolton was
1. During 1983, new civil case filings increased 14.3% over 1982, totalling 255,546 in the
United States district courts alone. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 7 (Dec. 1983). Former Chief Justice Burger has noted
that the average case load per federal district judge increased from 190 cases in 1940 to 350 cases in
1981. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
2. One district court judge has taken note of a Texas case, involving the builder and designer
of a nuclear plant, that was settled for $750 million. The case "might well be an indication of a
new-or at least more pervasive-attitude in the corporate world .... These companies may be
beginning to recognize that it is often better to settle than to battle .... " Noland, Better to Settle
Than to Battle?, 24 JUDGES' J. 24, 24 (Summer 1985).
The cost of litigation is not measurable in monetary terms alone. "[L]itigation is not only
stressful and frustrating but expensive and frequently unrewarding for litigants. A personal injury
case, for example, diverts the claimant and entire families from their normal pursuits. Physicians
increasingly take note of 'litigation neuroses' in otherwise normal, well-adjusted people." Burger,
supra note 1, at 275.
3. Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 120, 68 S.E.2d 805, 806 (1952).
4. 317 N.C. 623, 347 S.E.2d 369 (1986).
5. Id. at 624-26, 347 S.E.2d at 370-71.
6. Id. at 627-29, 347 S.E.2d at 371-73.
7. Id. at 624, 347 S.E.2d at 369-70. A prime contractor is a contractor who enters into a
direct contractual relationship with the owner of the project site. Although the terms "prime" and
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responsible for installation of the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning sys-
tems. Loving served as general contractor and was responsible, under the terms
of its contract with the State of North Carolina, for scheduling and coordinating
all work on the project. 8 The library was finished 480 days past the completion
date stipulated in each contractor's agreement with the State.9
One difficulty encountered in the process of construction was a water pipe
rupture allegedly caused by Bolton's workmen.10 Bolton's liability insurer,
without Bolton's consent, later paid Loving $136,445 in consideration for a "Re-
lease in Full" that" 'release[d] and forever discharge[d]' " Bolton and its insurer
" 'from all claims, demands, damages, actions, or causes of action'" relating to
property damage arising out of this water pipe rupture, and " 'for all claims or
demands whatsoever in law or in equity, which [Loving] shall or may have by
reason of any matter.., prior to [February 21, 1984].' "1 The release further
stated that it constituted " 'a full and final release of all claims of every nature
and kind whatsoever, and release[d] claims that are known and unknown, sus-
pected and unsuspected.' "12 However, the last paragraph of the release ex-
pressly reserved to "'any party hereby released... the right to assert any claim
or cause of action such party may have against the undersigned or any
others.' "13
Bolton sued Loving on contract and negligence theories for damages alleg-
edly incurred as a result of Loving's failure to properly schedule work on the
"general" contractor often are used interchangeably, the latter term technically refers to a specific
type of prime contractor. The term "general contractor" was coined in the nineteenth century when
entire building projects were completed by one contractor who employed many different kinds of
tradesmen. Today, the general contractor normally does only the foundation and structural work,
but is responsible to the owner for the entire project. Specialized work is subcontracted out by the
general contractor. K. COLLIER, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS § 1.2.4, at 27-28 (2d ed. 1987).
8. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 624, 347 S.E.2d at 369-70. An arrangement whereby an owner con-
tracts directly for general construction and other trades has been called a multiple prime contract.
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION 261 n.1 (1981). Such an arrangement is
an alternative to the owner entering into a contractual relationship with a general contractor, who in
turn enters into subcontracts with various mechanical tradesmen. The multiple prime arrangement
has been advanced as a means of eliminating the profit a general contractor earns on his or her
subcontracts. Id. at 261-62. In addition, a developer's use of multiple prime contracts is suited to
construction concepts, such as phase construction, that are aimed at efficient and swift completion of
a project. Id. at 262. Critical to the success of a multiple prime arrangement, however, is clear and
complete delineation of the rights and responsibilities of each contractor and of the owner. Schedul-
ing of work, coordination among primes, and liability for delay damages, should all be provided for
in the various contracts. Id. at 263.
North Carolina law requires a multiple prime arrangement for public building projects over
$50,000. In general, state entities or representatives must prepare separate specifications and enter
into separate contracts for (1) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; (2) plumbing and gas fit-
tings; (3) electrical wiring and installations; and (4) general construction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
128 (1983).
9. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 624, 347 S.E.2d at 370.
10. Loving claimed that the ruptured pipe resulted in a 62-day delay. Id.
11. Bolton Corp. v. T.A. Loving Co., 77 N.C. App. 90, 92, 334 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1985) (quoting
Release in Full dated Feb. 21, 1984, Record, Bolton Corp. at 18), rev'd, 317 N.C. 623, 347 S.E.2d 369
(1986).
12. Id. (quoting Release in Full dated Feb. 21, 1984, Record, Bolton Corp. at 18).
13. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 625, 347 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting Release in Full dated Feb. 21, 1984,
Record, Bolton Corp, at 18).
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library. 14 Loving filed a motion to dismiss and raised various defenses. Loving
also counterclaimed against Bolton for breach of contract and negligent per-
formance of Bolton's contract with the State. 15 Loving based its counterclaim
on the allegation that Bolton's workers negligently had caused the water pipe
rupture, an event that was specifically mentioned in the release executed by Lov-
ing) 6 Plaintiff replied that defendant's counterclaim was " 'barred by the doc-
trine of accord and satisfaction, settlement and release.' "17 The trial judge
14. Bolton alleged that Loving had breached its contract with the State and that Bolton was a
direct beneficiary of that contract. Bolton further alleged Loving had negligently breached a duty of
care arising from the working relationship between the two contractors. Finally, Bolton claimed
that Loving had breached its "duty of due care in the performance of its contract with the State."
Id. at 624, 347 S.E.2d at 370.
One commentator has noted that "[o]wners frequently insert strict notice of claim provisions,
no damage for delay clauses, and other exculpatory language in each of their prime contracts, which
... protect them from delay claims by delayed primes .. " PRACTISING LAW INSTITuTE, supra
note 8, at 270-71. Consequently, delayed primes often bypass a suit against the owner and instead
assert a claim against the prime contractor allegedly responsible for the delay. Id.
In North Carolina there is statutory authority for one prime contractor to pursue a claim
against another prime contractor arising out of a public building contract. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
128 (1983) provides that "[elach separate contractor shall be directly liable to the State of North
Carolina... and to the other separate contractors for the full performance of all duties and obliga-
tions due respectively under the terms of the separate contracts .... " Id. (emphasis added).
Some courts also have permitted actions by one prime against another on a direct contractual
theory. This "direct" theory is predicated on reciprocal provisions in the contracts of the prime
contractors, "pursuant to which a prime agrees to pay another prime damages it causes by failing to
coordinate properly its work in accordance with the construction schedule developed for the pro-
ject." PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 294; see, eg., 3. Louis Crum Corp. v. Alfred
Lindgren, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Edwin J. Dobson, Jr., Inc. v. Rutgers, State
Univ., 157 N.J. Super. 357, 384 A.2d 1121 (1978), aff'd sub nom. Broadway Maintenance Corp. v.
Rutgers, State Univ., 180 N.J. Super. 350, 434 A.2d 1125 (1981), aff'd, 90 N.J. 253, 447 A.2d 906
(1982).
If the direct benefit theory is unavailable to a delayed prime, it must predicate its cause of action
on a third-party beneficiary theory, because the delayed prime has no contract with the delaying
prime. In general, a donee or creditor third-party beneficiary may enforce a promise made for his or
her benefit, but one who is only an incidental beneficiary may not enforce the contract. 4 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 774, at 6 (1951). Plaintiff contractors have not always been
successful in their attempts to base an action on a third-party beneficiary theory. See, eg., Brother-
ton v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 213 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1954); Buchman Plumbing Co., Inc.
v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 298 Minn. 328, 215 N.W.2d 479 (1974); Gherardi v. Board of
Educ. of Trenton, 53 N.J. Super. 349, 147 A.2d 535 (App. Div. 1958). Contra M.T. Reed Constr.
Co. v. Virginia Metal Prods. Corp., 213 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1954); Visintine & Co. v. New York,
Chicago and St. Louis R.R. Co., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959); Corporation of President
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 98 Utah 297, 95
P.2d 736 (1939).
15. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 624, 347 S.E.2d at 370.
16. Id. at 624-25, 347 SE.2d at 370.
17. Id. at 625, 347 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting Plaintiff's Reply). An accord and satisfaction is a
discharge of a claim by performance different from that claimed to be due, in exchange for the
claimant's acceptance of this substituted performance in satisfaction of the claim asserted. A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1276, at 1041 (1952). The original claim may be based on
contract, quasi-contract, tort, or some other theory. Id. Compromise and settlement is one form of
accord and satisfaction. "Any claim can be discharged and satisfied by some substituted perform-
ance that is agreed upon; but it is only doubts and disputes that are compromised.... [A] compro-
mise [and settlement] is always an accord, but.., an accord is not necessarily a compromise." Id.
§ 1278, at 1044-45. Finally, a release is a written manifestation of the releasor's present intention to
discharge another from some duty. It is valid if supported by consideration or if reasonably relied
upon by the person discharged. Id. § 1238, at 993-94. In Bolton a disputed claim for damages
arising out of the rupture of the water pipe was compromised by the payment of a sum of money in
exchange for the execution of a release. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 625, 347 S.E.2d at 370.
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granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment.1 8 The court of appeals held that by
pleading the doctrines of accord and satisfaction, and settlement and release,
Bolton had ratified its insurer's settlement with the defendant. 19 The effect of
the settlement was to bar all claims between the parties. As a result, both the
original claim and the counterclaim were barred.
20
In a split decision21 the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals. 22 Although it agreed that plaintiff had ratified its insurer's settle-
ment with defendant, the supreme court held that the reservation of rights
clause in the settlement should be given effect.23 The court noted that the par-
ties had an ongoing contractual relationship involving multiple transactions and
occurrences. 24 It followed, the court reasoned, that the settlement might have
been intended to compromise certain claims only, rather than all potential
claims between the parties. Thus, to preserve this intent, the court concluded
that the reservation of rights clause should be given effect.25 Finally, when
plaintiff pleaded the release in its reply to defendant's counterclaim, it ratified
the entire agreement, including the reservation of rights clause.
26
North Carolina law on settlement agreements has developed largely in the
context of automobile accident cases. In such cases settlements have been held
to "[constitute] an acknowledgment, as between the parties, of the liability of the
[payor/releasee] and the nonliability, or at least a waiver of the liability, of the
[payee/releasor]." 27 Once a settlement has been reached, neither party may sue
the other for negligence allegedly arising out of the collision giving rise to the
settlement and release.2 8
The effect of a settlement becomes more complex when one party's insur-
ance carrier, without the consent of the insured, negotiates and executes the
settlement with the other party. The insurer's right to take such action depends
on the terms of the insurance policy and any applicable statutory provisions.
29
Even if the carrier's action is authorized by policy or statute, however, the settle-
ment does not preclude the insured from asserting a claim against the releasor
when "the settlement was made without the knowledge or consent of the insured
or over his protest, unless the insured in the meantime has ratified such
18. Bolon, 317 N.C. at 626, 347 S.E.2d at 371.
19. Bolton, 77 N.C. App. at 96, 334 S.E.2d at 499.
20. Id.
21. Justice Billings wrote for the majority. Justice Martin filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Mitchell joined. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 630, 347 S.E.2d at 373 (Martin, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 623, 347 S.E.2d at 369.
23. Id. at 627-28, 347 S.E.2d at 371-72; see supra text accompanying note 13.
24. Id. at 627, 347 S.E.2d at 371.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 628, 347 S.E.2d at 372.
27. Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 120, 68 S.E.2d 805, 806 (1952).
28. Id.
29. In the case of motor vehicle liability policies, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(f)(3) (1983)
grants the insurer "the right to settle any claim covered by the policy, and if such settlement is made
in good faith, the amount thereof shall be deductible from the limits of liability specified [by stat-
ute]." Id.
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settlement."'30
"Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind
him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as
to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him. '31
When the principal's actions evidence assent to the act of the agent, ratification
is implied. One way such assent may be manifested is by instituting or defending
against an action based on the unauthorized act, with knowledge of the material
facts regarding that act.3 2 Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held
that when a plaintiff/releasee pleads a settlement and release as a defense to the
defendant/releasor's counterclaim for injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent, plaintiff has ratified the settlement and release. As a result, both the coun-
terclaim and plaintiff's own claim are barred. 33
Keith v. Glenn 34 dealt with such a factual situation. Plaintiff Keith sued for
personal injuries and property damage arising out of an automobile accident.
Defendant Glenn counterclaimed for personal injuries and property damage
arising out of the same collision. Plaintiff's reply pleaded a settlement and re-
lease executed by defendant and plaintiff's liability insurer as a bar to the coun-
terclaim.35 The North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiff had ratified
the settlement and, therefore, both the claim and counterclaim were barred. 36
In response to plaintiff's contention that "payment by his insurance carrier for
injuries he inflicts should not impair his right to compensation for injuries he
sustains," the court emphasized that plaintiff's insurance policy provided liabil-
ity rather than accident insurance coverage. 37 Unless plaintiff was legally liable
for the accident, the insurance carrier was not obligated to pay defendant. The
court implied that in ratifying the settlement plaintiff essentially had concurred
with the insurer and defendant that plaintiff was at fault in the collision. The
court noted that in a state such as North Carolina, where contributory negli-
gence bars any recovery by the plaintiff,3 8 ratification necessarily bars a plain-
tiff's claim because an award of damages to a plaintiff would be inconsistent
30. Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713, 714, 110 S.E.2d 316, 317 (1959); accord Campbell v. Brown,
251 N.C. 214, 214, 110 S.E.2d 897, 897 (1959) (per curiam); Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132,
139-40, 108 S.E.2d 535, 539-40 (1959).
31. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 82, at 210 (1958).
32. Patterson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 266 N.C. 489, 493, 146 S.E.2d
390, 393 (1966). Pleading the settlement as an affirmative defense, in reply to a counterclaim, or in a
motion to strike all constitute ratification of the settlement. Bradford v. Kelly, 260 N.C. 382, 388,
132 S.E.2d 886, 890 (1963). If the insured has pleaded the release, he or sl'e can revoke this ratifica-
tion by withdrawing the pleading, but only if the releasor has not subsequently alleged the insured's
ratification as a bar to the insured's claim. Once the releasor pleads the insured's ratification of the
carrier's settlement, the insured's ratification becomes irrevocable. Fowler v. McLean, 30 N.C. App.
393, 394-95, 226 S.E.2d 867, 869, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 776, 229 S.E.2d 32 (1976); White v. Perry, 7
N.C. App. 36, 39, 171 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1969).
33. See Keith v. Glenn, 262 N.C. 284, 136 S.E.2d 665 (1964).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 286-87, 136 S.E.2d at 667-78.
36. Id.; accord Shields v. Del Rosario, 303 So. 2d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied,
315 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1975).
37. Keith, 262 N.C. at 286, 136 S.E.2d at 667.
38. E.g., Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980); Clark v. Roberts,
263 N.C. 336, 139 S.E.2d 593 (1965).
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with the settlement.3 9
Under the theory of ratification of settlement and release propounded by
the court in Keith, a plaintiff is not absolutely deprived of an opportunity to
contest the liability issue. The Keith court approved an analysis set out earlier in
Bradford v. Kelly4° that afforded plaintiff the option either to ratify the settle-
ment, or in the alternative, to refrain from pleading the settlement and litigate
the liability issue anew.4 1 The Bradford court reasoned that ratification barred
both parties' claims, for plaintiff "may not blow hot and cold." 42 If plaintiff
instead declined to plead the settlement and release, plaintiff would be permitted
to pursue his or her claim against defendant, but would also "personally assume
the risk that a judgment in excess of the carrier's compromise payment to the
defendant might be rendered against her on the counterclaim." 43 Whichever
route plaintiff decides to take, plaintiff "must, when he accepts the benefits, ...
bear its burdens." 44
If it is established that the insured has ratified the settlement and release,
the release binds the insured to the same extent that it binds the insurance com-
pany.45 To determine the effect of the settlement and release on those bound by
it, the North Carolina courts have employed traditional contract interpretation
and construction techniques.4 6 Virtually any court construing a contract begins,
either expressly or implicitly, with the proposition that the parties' intent is par-
amount.47 "The heart of a contract is the intention of the parties. [This] inten-
tion.., must be determined from the language of the contract, the purposes of
the contract, the subject matter and the situation of the parties at the time the
contract is executed." 48 Various specific rules of contract construction are ulti-
39. See supra text accompanying note 27.
40. 260 N.C. 382, 132 S.E.2d 886 (1963).
41. Id. at 387-88, 132 S.E.2d at 890.
42. Id. at 388, 132 S.E.2d at 890.
43. Id.
44. Keith, 262 N.C. at 287, 136 S.E.2d at 668. Regardless of whether the plaintiff/releasee
decides to ratify the settlement, the insurance carrier is protected from further liability to the relea-
sor. In Bradford the insurance carrier sought to intervene so that it could plead the release and
thereby ensure that it would not be bound by any judgment that defendant might obtain against the
insured plaintiff. Bradford, 260 N.C. at 384, 132 S.E.2d at 888. The court held that the carrier's
petition to intervene was premature until a determination had been made whether plaintiff had rati-
fied the settlement. Id. at 385, 132 S.E.2d at 888. At the carrier's request, however, the court
addressed what effect defendant's counterclaim would have on the carrier if it were decided that
plaintiff had not ratified the settlement and release. Id. at 385, 132 S.E.2d at 889. The court stated
that the release would provide the carrier with a complete defense in any action the defendant/
releasor might bring against it to enforce a judgment obtained on the counterclaim. "Having negoti-
ated with the insurance company and taken its money as consideration for the release, a party would
be estopped to make any further claim against the carrier for injuries growing out of the collision
which was the subject matter of the settlement." Id. at 388, 132 S.E.2d at 890.
45. See supra text accompanying note 31.
46. Although construction and interpretation often are used synonymously, the two terms are
distinguishable. Interpretation is "the process of applying the legal standard to expressions found in
the agreement in order to determine their meaning." 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 602, at 320 (1961). In contrast, construction of a contract refers to the determination
of the legal meaning of the entire agreement. Id.
47. E.g., Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc., 288 N.C. 484, 492, 219 S.E.2d 190, 196 (1975);
Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 409-10, 200 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1973).
48. Adder, 288 N.C. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 196. It is the contracting parties' objective expression
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mately used by courts to give effect to the intention of the parties to the contract.
One such rule of construction long employed by virtually all jurisdictions,
including North Carolina, is that every part of a contract must be given effect if
this can be accomplished "by fair and reasonable intendment."'49 This guideline
reflects a presumption that each part of a contract expresses an " 'intelligible
intent, i.e., means something.' "o50 Each part must be considered in context with
the remainder of the contract's provisions so that the meaning of both the partic-
ular provision and the entire contract can be discerned. 5 ' Courts in many juris-
dictions have harmonized apparently conflicting clauses, one general in nature
and the other more specific, on the theory that the specific clause was intended
to limit the general clause.5 2 However, when a given clause cannot be reconciled
with a preceding clause and conflicts with the general purpose of the contract,
the inconsistent clause will be set aside.53
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Burgess54 the North Carolina
Supreme Court applied these rules of construction to a settlement agreement
that contained words of general release, but also included seemingly inconsistent
language purporting to reserve certain rights of the releasor.5 The court ex-
of intent, rather than their subjective intent, which the courts seek to give effect. "The juristic effect
of a contract is of necessity governed by the expressed intention of the parties. We look for the
operative meaning of the symbols of expression designed to affect their legal relations. Their unex-
pressed intention is immaterial ...." George M. Brewster & Son, Inc. v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17
N.J. 20, 27-28, 109 A.2d 805, 809 (1954).
When a written contract is deemed unambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence such as oral
understanding, custom and usage, and prior negotiations is not admissible to show the intention of
the parties to the contract. For a general discussion of the "parol evidence rule," see 4 S. WILLIS-
TON, supra note 46, §§ 631-632.
49. See Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Burgess, 223 N.C. 97, 100, 25 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1943);
see also Moyer v. Walker, 276 F.2d 681, 683 (10th Cir. 1960) (it is a "cardinal rule of construction"
that, if possible, contracts must be construed to give effect to all their clauses); Central Ga. Elec.
Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 217 Ga. 171, 121 S.E.2d 644 (1961) (construing a contract
proviso to give all clauses reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning); Laevin v. St. Vincent De Paul
Soc'y, 323 Mich. 607, 36 N.W.2d 163 (1949) (contract must be construed as a whole and all its parts
harmonized if reasonably possible); Corhill Corp. v. S.D. Plants, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 595, 176 N.E.2d 37,
217 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961) (construing a "Release of Liens" so as to give meaning to all its provisions).
50. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Burgess, 223 N.C. 97, 100, 25 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1943)
(quoting Wooten v. Hobbs, 170 N.C. 211, 214, 86 S.E. 811, 812 (1915)).
51. Id.
52. A more particular clause also has been held to restrict a general clause when the specific
provision is inconsistent with only a portion of the general clause. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Rowland, 111 Ga. App. 743, 747, 143 S.E.2d 193, 196-97 (1965); Mealey v. Kanealy, 226 Iowa
1266, 1277-78, 286 N.W. 500, 506 (1939).
53. See Westinghouse, 223 N.C. at 100, 25 S.E.2d at 392; Davis v. Frazier, 150 N.C. 447, 64
S.E. 200 (1909). Rather than straining to employ "hairline distinctions... [or] circuitous reason-
ing" to give effect to all contract provisions, courts favor a construction that will be consistent with
the apparent purpose of the entire agreement. O'Neil Supply Co. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co.,
280 N.Y. 50, 56, 19 N.E.2d 676, 679 (1939); accord Capitol Bus Co. v. Blue Bird Coach Lines, Inc.,
478 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1973); Hanson v. Stern, 102 Ga. App. 341, 116 S.E.2d 237 (1960).
54. 223 N.C. 97, 25 S.E.2d 390 (1943).
55. Plaintiff furnished material to defendant, who served as general contractor on a construc-
tion project. Id. at 99-101, 25 S.E.2d at 392. At some point, defendant was unable to fulfill its
obligations under the construction contract, so defendant's surety became primarily responsible for
meeting the contract's terms. Id. at 101, 25 S.E.2d at 393. Plaintiff and the surety executed a
compromise agreement by which plaintiff completely discharged all its claims against the defendant
and its surety for labor and material furnished in connection with the construction contract. Id.
Another part of the compromise agreement reserved to plaintiff its rights against defendant " 'for
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amined the circumstances surrounding the settlement and determined that the
reservation of rights was intended to limit the general release language. There-
fore, the reservation of rights was given effect.56
Although Bolton involved contract delay claims 57 rather than personal in-
jury or property damage arising in tort, the execution of a release and the subse-
quent litigation of the release in Bolton mirror the sequence of events in Keith.58
Because an exchange of a release from liability for a monetary payment consti-
tutes a contractual agreement between the parties, contract principles play an
important role in determining the construction and effect of such a settlement
and release, regardless of whether the underlying claim arises in tort, contract,
or otherwise.5 9 Therefore, the rationale of Keith, Bradford, and other automo-
bile accident settlement cases provided a natural starting point for the supreme
court in Bolton.
The court of appeals in Bolton applied the rule of the automobile accident
cases to bar the claims of both Bolton and Loving.60 Relying on the benefit/
burden language in Bradford,61 the court held that by voluntarily choosing to
plead the release as a bar to defendant's counterclaim, plaintiff had avoided the
risk that it would have to pay a judgment without the help of its insurance
carrier.62 The court of appeals stated, however, that the "burden of such action
is that plaintiff's claims are also barred."' 63 The supreme court agreed with the
court of appeals that plaintiff Bolton had ratified its insurer's agreement with
defendant.64 When the court considered the effects of this ratification, however,
it diverged from both the analysis and holding of the court of appeals. 65
The supreme court in Bolton first distinguished Keith, Bradford, and the
other automobile collision cases on the basis of the nature of the claim underly-
ing the release. 66 The court reasoned that the rule precluding an insured who
items which the United States Casualty Company disclaim [sic] any and all liability under its respec-
tive bonds.'" Id. at 101, 25 S.E.2d at 392-93 (quoting release agreement).
56. Id. at 101, 25 S.E.2d at 393. The result reached in Westinghouse is contrary to that reached
in cases involving joint tortfeasors. In such cases North Carolina courts have refused to give effect to
settlement provisions purporting to release one joint tortfeasor while reserving the releasor's claim
against the remaining joint tortfeasors. See, eg., Simpson v. Plyler, 258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843
(1963); Ottinger v. Chronister, 13 N.C. App. 91, 185 S.E.2d 292 (1971). For a discussion of the
rationale in the joint tortfeasor cases, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
58. In Bolton as well as in Keith the insured party, who was not originally a party to the settle-
ment and release negotiated by the insurance carrier, sued the releasor. Upon the filing of a counter-
claim by the releasor for the same damages that were the subject of the compromise agreement, the
plaintiff insured in each case pleaded the doctrine of accord and satisfaction as a bar to the counter-
claim. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17, 34-35.
59. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 632, 347 S.E.2d at 374 (Martin, J., dissenting).
60. Bolton, 77 N.C. App. at 96, 334 S.E.2d at 499.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
62. Bolton, 77 N.C. App. at 95, 334 S.E.2d at 498.
63. Id.
64. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 628, 347 S.E.2d at 372. The supreme court did not expressly address
whether plaintiff's actions constituted ratification of its insurer's actions. Instead, the supreme
court's decision implicitly assumes that plaintiff had ratified the compromise agreement. Id.
65. Id. at 629, 347 S.E.2d at 373.
66. Id. at 626-27, 347 S.E.2d at 371.
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has ratified a settlement from thereafter pursuing an action against the releasor
makes sense in the context of a negligence action. 67 In North Carolina contribu-
tory negligence acts as a total bar to recovery. Therefore, "it would be factually
inconsistent for the plaintiff.., to be allowed to recover against the defendant"
once plaintiff has ratified the compromise agreement calling for plaintiff's in-
surer to make payment to defendant, because the settlement acknowledges the
liability of the party making payment in exchange for a release. 68 If plaintiff,
through its insurer, has made payment to defendant, then plaintiff's liability has
been acknowledged, and it is not entitled to recover in a court action.6
9
In contrast to Keith and Bradford, Bolton involved not "a single incident,
an accident, [but] an ongoing contractual relationship and multiple transac-
tions."' 70 Moreover, the cost overruns alleged by plaintiff could have been
caused by delays unrelated to the ruptured water line, the specified subject of the
release. 7 1 It follows that the settlement made by plaintiff's insurer and later
ratified by plaintiff was not necessarily dispositive of the issue of liability for all
possible claims arising out of the parties' working relationship. The court con-
cluded that the reservation of rights language in the release should not be over-
ridden by mechanical application of the rule, laid down in cases such as Keith,
that a ratified settlement bars an action by the insured.72
67. Id. at 627, 347 S.E.2d at 371.
68. Id. The court cited Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 68 S.E.2d 805 (1952), for the
proposition that settlement of automobile accident cases essentially decides the issue of liability. See
supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
69. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 627, 347 S.E.2d at 371. The South Carolina Supreme Court also has
interpreted Keith and Bradford as being predicated on the inseparability of the negligence claim
underlying the settlement and release. Brazell Bros. Contractors v. Hill, 245 S.C. 69, 138 S.E.2d 835
(1964), involved an automobile collision. As in Keith, plaintiff's insurance carrier settled with de-
fendant, and plaintiff later ratified the settlement by pleading it as a bar to defendant's counterclaim.
Id. at 72, 138 S.E.2d at 836. Defendant contended that Keith and Bradford should be followed and
plaintiff's action barred. Id. at 72-73, 138 S.E.2d at 837. The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
sponded that the North Carolina courts deem a ratified settlement to be a bar to an action by the
insured, "without regard to the terms of the compromise and settlement or the intention of the
parties." Id. at 73, 138 S.E.2d at 837. The apparent reason for such a mechanical application of the
rule, the court continued, is that in North Carolina only one cause of action can arise out of a single
car accident. Id. "When the claims of the opposing parties are viewed as a single cause of action, it
is plausible to import mutuality to any settlement between them, thus barring the right of either
party to pursue the other, even though the release is, by its terms, unilateral." Id. at 74, 138 S.E.2d
at 837.
The Brazell court concluded that because in South Carolina opposing parties in a car collision
have distinct causes of action, Keith and Bradford were inapposite. Id. Therefore, the parties' intent
as evidenced by the release controlled. This intent was to settle defendant's claim alone, so plaintiff's
claims should not be barred. Id. at 75-76, 138 S.E.2d at 838.
70. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 627, 347 S.E.2d at 371.
71. Indeed, the court noted that the targeted completion date had long passed by the time the
water line broke. Id.
72. The court pointed out the end result should the rule be applied:
By saying that the reservation of rights clause has no effect, we would be saying that for the
price of settling the issue of its liability resulting from the broken waterpipe, the plaintiff
gave up all of its own completely unrelated claims against the defendant, even though the
settlement agreement did not so provide. There is no logical reason for making the rule in
automobile accident cases apply to the situation here.
Id.
Implicit in the court's reasoning is the assumption that the reservation of rights clause reflected
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The court also distinguished Keith, Bradford, and the other automobile ac-
cident cases on the basis that the releases executed in those cases did not contain
language purporting to reserve the rights of the insured.73 In doing so, the court
implied that even if it applied the car accident rule to other situations in which
the parties have an ongoing relationship, the plaintiff insured's claim should not
be barred in this instance because the release executed by Loving contained lan-
guage reserving the rights of the insured. This reservation of rights was pre-
served when Bolton ratified the settlement; the effect of ratification was that the
insured adopted the entire settlement, including the reservation of rights.74
By drawing a distinction between releases that do include a reservation of
rights and those that do not, the supreme court abandoned its earlier argument,
which rationalized the rule in the car accident cases on the basis of the insepara-
ble nature of the claim underlying the settlement and release. 75 In doing so, the
court oversimplified the inquiry. Language in certain of the car accident cases
indicates that the rule barring both parties' claims upon execution of a release is
predicated on the inseparable nature of that claim. 7 6 As previously discussed,
these cases have stated that a settlement effectively disposes of the question of
liability.77 In addition, settlements purporting to release one joint tortfeasor
while reserving the releasor's claims against the remaining joint tortfeasors have
been construed as releasing all tortfeasors. 78 In such cases courts do not give
effect to the reservation of rights language. As in the cases involving only one
tortfeasor, the reason North Carolina courts have offered for this rule is that the
claim is single and inseparable.79 The Bolton court's suggestion that the inclu-
the parties' intent to limit the general release. Later in the opinion, the court expressly analyzed the
parties' intent as embodied in the release. See infra text accompanying notes 81-86.
73, Bolton, 317 N.C. at 627, 347 S.E.2d at 371-72.
74, Id. at 628, 347 S.E.2d at 372. This analysis is consistent with the rule that a principal
cannot ratify only part of a contract made by his or her agent. Patterson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 266 N.C. 489, 494, 146 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1966); Keith, 262 N.C. at 287, 136 S.E.2d
at 668.
Because plaintiff did not consent to the settlement at the time it was executed, the court of
appeals in Bolton interpreted the reservation of rights clause as simply "a restatement of the law
concerning a nonconsenting insured's rights: that by not consenting to its insurer's settlement and
release, it retained its right to pursue any claims it may have against the defendant." Bolton, 77
N.C. App. at 96, 334 S.E.2d at 499. When plaintiff later ratified the settlement, it relinquished this
right. Id. The supreme court disagreed with this construction of the release: "The reservation of
rights clause does not purport to reserve claims or causes of action only if the party released does not
ratify the release; it reserves them completely." Bolton, 317 N.C. at 628, 347 S.E.2d at 372.
75. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
76. For example, the court in Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 68 S.E.2d 805 (1952),
stated that upon settlement, "[n]either party thereafter had any right to pursue the other in respect
to any liability arising out of any alleged negligence proximately causing the collision which is the
subject matter of this suit." Id. at 120, 68 S.E.2d at 806.
77. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 27-28; accord Lyon v. Younger, 35 N.C. App. 408,
410-11, 241 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1978); Fowler v. McLean, 30 N.C. App. 393, 394, 226 S.E.2d 867, 869,
cert. denied, 290 N.C. 776, 229 S.E.2d 32 (1976); McKinney v. Morrow, 18 N.C. App. 282, 284, 196
S.E.2d 585, 587, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 665, 197 S.E.2d 874 (1973).
78. E.g., Simpson v. Plyler, 258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963); Ottinger v. Chronister, 13
N.C. App. 91, 185 S.E.2d 292 (1971).
79. The inquiry in the joint tortfeasor cases centers on whether plaintiff/releasor's cause of
action has been extinguished through the settlement instrument. "If it appears from the instrument
that covenantor has discharged his cause of action against the covenantee, ajoint tort-feasor, it is not
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sion of a reservation of rights clause is, in and of itself, enough to preserve plain-
tiff's claim, ignores the rationale of past North Carolina Supreme Court
decisions. The first argument made by the court, which recognized the "insepa-
rable claim" rationale, correctly analyzed the case in light of past supreme court
decisions. 80
In holding that plaintiff was not barred from asserting its claim,8 1 the court
necessarily construed the release as reserving any of Bolton's claims that arose
out of the working relationship of the parties. The court expressly recognized
that the intention of the parties to the settlement was of primary importance in
construing the release. 82 Citing with favor the Westinghouse 83 case, the Bolton
court emphasized that releases are to be construed liberally so that this intention
can be given full effect. 84 Because the reservation of rights clause applied " 'to
any party hereby released,'" and the release specifically applied to Bolton as
well as its insurer, the court concluded that the parties intended for Loving to
surrender all its claims against Bolton in exchange for payment, and for Bolton
to retain its claims against Loving.8 5 The court also noted that the circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the release supported this interpretation.
The release was not executed until after the claim and counterclaim were filed,
so "[p]resumably defendant knew what the contract provided and was satisfied
a matter for construction, all joint tort-feasors are released.... The cause of action is single, indivisi-
ble, and non-apportionable." Simpson, 258 N.C. at 394-95, 128 S.E.2d at 846.
80. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. Dictum in Moore v. Young, 263 N.C. 483,
139 S.E.2d 704 (1965), also indicates that the automobile collision cases would not have been de-
cided any differently had those releases contained language reserving the rights of the insured. In
Moore plaintiff instituted an action for personal injury and property damage sustained in a collision.
Record at 16, Moore (No. 522, Fall Term 1964). Defendant asserted a counterclaim, id. at 7, and
plaintiff fied a reply alleging defendant's contributory negligence, id. at 9-10. Defendant's insurer
then settled with plaintiff, and plaintiff executed a release. Id. at 10. Plaintiff took a voluntary
nonsuit on his claim, and a consent judgment was entered dismissing plaintiff's claim without preju-
dice to defendant's counterclaim. Id. at 11-12. The supreme court held that plaintiff, having effec-
tively "agreed that defendant should take the offensive in any future litigation," could not reinstate
his claim. Moore, 263 N.C. at 486, 139 S.E.2d at 707.
The court went on to describe what would have occurred had the consent judgment dismissed
not only the plaintiff/releasor's claim, but also the counterclaim of the defendant/releasee, without
prejudice to defendant's cause of action. The court concluded that should the releasee later institute
suit and the releasor interpose a counterclaim, the rules laid down in Bradford and Keith would
apply. Id. It follows that in such a situation, if the releasee should plead the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction in reply to the counterclaim, both claims would be barred, despite the "without preju-
dice" language of the consent judgment.
The Moore case can be rationalized on other grounds, however. The supreme court in Moore
expressly stated that the words "without prejudice" have a special meaning. When used, the words
"without prejudice" "' import into any transaction that the parties have agreed that as between
themselves the receipt of money by one and its payment by the other shall not... have any legal
effect upon the rights of the parties.., and that such rights will be... open to settlement by legal
controversy .... ' Id. at 485-86, 139 S.E.2d at 706-07 (quoting Hinton v. Bogart, 79 Misc. 418,
420, 140 N.Y.S. 111, 113 (1913), rev'd, 166 A.D. 155, 151 N.Y.S. 796 (1915)). The "without preju-
dice" language thus preserves the issue of liability completely for each party. In contrast, a reserva-
tion of rights clause applies only to the rights of the party to whom it refers.
81. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 629-30, 347 S.E.2d at 373.
82. Id. at 628, 347 S.E.2d at 372; see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
83. 223 N.C. 97, 25 S.E.2d 390 (1943). For a discussion of Westinghouse, see supra notes 54-56
and accompanying text.
84. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 628-29, 347 S.E.2d at 372.
85. Id. at 629, 347 S.E.2d at 372.
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with its terms."'86
The holding in Bolton is sound. It avoids the danger of courts essentially
rewriting a settlement by barring both parties' claims, despite the parties' clear
intention to reserve certain rights. The court's refusal to override-through
rigid application of the rule applied in Bradford, Keith, and the other automobile
accident cases-the contractual intent embodied in the release allows con-
tracting parties to retain control of the contractual process. Freedom to enter
into contractual relationships is so deeply engrained in our legal system that
some jurisdictions consider it a violation of public policy for a court to attempt
to "rewrite" a contract.87 These jurisdictions have held that when the parties'
intent was to settle only one component of the damage sustained, such as prop-
erty damage, a subsequent legal action seeking to recover for physical injury
sustained in the same incident should be permitted, despite the general prohibi-
tion against splitting one's cause of action. 88
In addition to its tendency to preserve the integrity of the contractual pro-
cess, the supreme court's decision in Bolton also encourages settlement. Con-
tracting parties can settle discrete, individual disputes without fear that they are
also jeopardizing other claims that may have arisen. The supreme court recog-
nized this when it noted that uniform and rigid application of the rule in the
automobile accident cases would render it "legally impossible for parties to settle
only one aspect of a multifaceted dispute."'8 9 The dissent in Bolton replied that
to limit the settlement to the broken water pipe claim, the parties simply could
have executed a specific, rather than a general, release. 90 However, requiring
the parties to execute a prescribed form of release to ensure the courts will pre-
serve their intent reduces the parties' control over the contracting process. If the
instrument evidences an intent to reserve either party's right to assert discrete
claims, there is no reason to defeat that intent by imposing the rule that the
insured's ratification of a settlement bars both parties' claims.
Bolton provides an excellent example of a situation in which the ability to
negotiate freely and to settle individual claims is of central importance. In a
large, complex building project involving a number of different contractors, it is
no simple task to find the causes of delays, and to compute the damages incurred
as the result of these delays.9 1 It is even more difficult to determine what por-
86. Id. at 629, 347 S.E.2d at 372-73.
87. Eg., Glover v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 229 Ga. 874, 195 S.E.2d 11 (1972).
88. Id.; see also Clemons v. Clark, 172 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (holding it proper
to strike defendant's defense that there was a splitting of plaintiff's claim when a release for only
property damage had been executed); Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 342,
173 S.E.2d 723 (1970) (noting that a defendant may waive the requirement that a plaintiff include all
elements of his or her damage in one action); Frankel v. Quaker City Cab Co., 82 Pa. Super. 217(1923) (settling personal injury component and litigating only property damage was within spirit of
rule that one should not be subjected to two suits arising from one cause of action; ending litigation
is in the public interest). Contra Thompson v. Kivett & Reel, Inc., 25 So. 2d 124 (La. Ct. App. 1946)(holding that acceptance of payment for property damage destroyed plaintiff's cause of action for
any future claims based on the same accident).
89. Bolton, 317 N.C. at 627, 347 S.E.2d at 371.
90. Id. at 631-32, 347 S.E.2d at 374 (Martin, I., dissenting).
91. One commentator has stated:
1218 FVol. 65
tion of the damages is attributable to each causative factor.92 Therefore, con-
tractors should have the opportunity, free from legalistic constraints, to settle
each claim as they gather adequate information about the cost overruns incurred
and the reasons for the overruns.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Bolton is based on gener-
ally sound reasoning and is consistent with past decisions of the court. The
Bolton decision also encourages settlement, which is normally less costly and
time consuming than litigation. Most importantly, by recognizing the crucial
differences between a compromise of claims arising out of an automobile acci-
dent and a settlement of a cause of action arising out of a lengthy, complex
contractual relationship, the court has eliminated a potential source of unwar-
ranted interference by courts in the contracting process. As a result, the parties
to a contract will be better able to retain control over the legal effect of the
bargains they make.
MARY ELIZABETH MOORE
Construction delays reverse the typical balance in litigation. Normally, most efforts are
directed toward proving liability rather than damages. In construction, the failure of one
party to provide something necessary to the performance of the other party is relatively
easy to prove and will suffice for proof of liability. Tying the breach directly to increased
costs exclusively attributable to that breach can be quite another matter.
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 126-27 (footnote omitted).
Even if it is established that a breach did cause some amount of damages, the extent of the
delayed contractor's damages often is not easily proven. A delayed contractor can sustain damages
in many different forms, such as labor overrun and other jobsite damages, increased material costs,
inefficiency, idle equipment, home office overhead, prejudgment interest costs, and loss of profits.
See generally id. at 158-78 (discussing cases in which the recoverability of various types of delay
damages has been addressed).
92. "Apportioning damages is made difficult by the fact of concurrent delays and the problem
of not being able to determine which costs are attributable to the delay. Courts will make no effort
to apportion damages where both parties have contributed to the delays." A.B.A. SECTION OF IN-
SURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT CLAIMS 138
(1978) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of methodologies useful in apportioning and proving
damages, see PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 150-57 (advocating the "critical path
method," which "depicts the relationship of the various items of work over time and the dependence
of one construction activity on the other activities").
12191987] CONTRA CTS
